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ABSTRACT:. This article tests four models of how parental and childhood welfare use 
affects sons' labor supply: the correlated disadvantages model, Wilson's structural-envi- 
ronmental model, Mead's welfare culture model, and Murray's incentives model. Past 
research is extended by including measures of all seven factors that these models pre- 
dict will shape sons' labor supply: parental welfare use, neighborhood welfare use, par- 
ental income, family noneconomic resources, neighborhood resources, labor market con- 
ditions, and state welfare benefits. There are four main findings. First, welfare use in 
the childhood neighborhood has no effects on sons' work hours. Second, only one group 
of sons is affected by parental welfare use: black sons' whose parents average $7,500 or 
more in welfare income per year. Third, black sons' adult work hours are strongly pre- 
dicted by parental poverty and by labor market conditions; together these account for 
half the estimated relationships between heavy parental welfare use and black sons' 
labor supply. Fourth, parents' and neighbors' work hours strongly predict nonblack 
sons' labor supply. 
KEY WORDS: labor supply, poverty, underclass, welfare culture. 
Introduction 
There is a growing consensus among policy makers  and academics 
tha t  welfare needs to be reformed and tha t  t ime limits on welfare 
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use are both desirable and necessary. In his presidential campaign, 
William Clinton promised to "end welfare as we know it" and to 
limit Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) use to two 
years. Two-year time limits on AFDC receipt are expected to be a 
key component of the welfare reform proposal from the Clinton 
Working Group on Welfare Reform, Family Support and Indepen- 
dence. 
This consensus on the necessity for welfare reform grows out of two 
very different explanations of the welfare problem. One set of poverty 
theorists sees welfare as symptomatic of larger societal problems: dis- 
crimination, structural economic problems, racial segregation, the 
growing concentration of poverty, and social isolation in inner city 
ghettoes (Jencks & Peterson, 1991; Massey, 1990; Massey & Eggers, 
1990; Wilson, 1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1993). These theorists argue that 
these larger problems generate out-of-wedlock births, joblessness, and 
intergenerational poverty in inner cities. A second set of welfare 
critics sees the welfare system itself as the problem and argues that 
the system violates U.S. norms about self-sufficiency, encourages out- 
of-wedlock births, destroys work incentives, and promotes joblessness 
both within and across generations (Anderson, 1978; Bernstein, 1982; 
Mead, 1986, 1992; Murray, 1984). 
One way to understand how the proposed welfare reforms will af- 
fect children's adult attainments is to examine how the current wel- 
fare system actually has affected children's lives. This article esti- 
mates how and whether growing up in welfare-dependent homes and 
neighborhoods influences sons' adult labor supply. That topic was cho- 
sen because much of the antiwelfare rhetoric holds that daughters 
raised on welfare become pregnant as teenagers and go on AFDC and 
that  sons raised on welfare grow up to be shiftless adults. There have 
been numerous studies of the links between mothers' and daughters' 
welfare use but few investigations of the links between mothers' wel- 
fare and sons' work efforts. 
The article is divided into four sections. It begins by outlining social 
scientists' explanations of and the empirical evidence on the links be- 
tween parents' and neighbors' welfare use and sons' adult labor sup- 
ply. This is followed by a description of the data sample, variables, 
and model. Then the analyses and results are presented. The last 
section summarizes the implications of the results for poverty theory 
and policy. 
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Explanations of Intergenerational Effects of Welfare on 
Men's Labor Supply 
There are several reasons why one might expect to see correlations 
between parental  (or neighborhood) welfare use and sons' labor sup- 
ply. The first and simplest reason (correlated disadvantages) is that  
welfare families and welfare neighborhoods have fewer resources and 
more disadvantages than  do nonwelfare families and neighborhoods 
with low rates of welfare use. Perhaps it is these disadvantages, not 
parental (neighborhood) welfare use, that  lead to the correlation be- 
tween parental (neighborhood) welfare use and children's adult sta- 
tus. Some differences (e.g., poverty, family structure, parents'  human  
capital, parents'  and neighbors' work hours) can be controlled, but  
others (parental health, parents'  values, neighborhood crimes, and 
school quality) are harder to measure and control. It is plausible that  
the same parental  and neighborhood disadvantages that  affect par- 
ents' and neighborhood residents' ability to avoid welfare also affect 
sons' abilities to find work as adults. To the extent that  this is true, 
t ime limits on welfare may have li t t le effect on children's economic 
outcomes and instead more resources should be provided to disadvan- 
taged families and communities. 
A second set of structural and environmental explanations empha- 
sizes that  labor market  conditions, demographic changes, racial dis- 
crimination, and racial segregation are key causes of long-term wel- 
fare use and male joblessness. Wilson's (1987) social isolation model is 
the best known and most influential of the structural-environmental 
explanations. Wilson (1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1993) claims that  the loss 
of well-paid manufacturing jobs from the inner cities and the out- 
migration of middle-class blacks from urban poverty areas have 
caused a crisis in the inner city. First, the shift of manufacturing em- 
ployment from the cities to the suburbs means a loss of jobs compati- 
ble with ghetto residents' skills. At the same time, the out-migration 
of middle-class blacks from the inner city left poor inner city residents 
behind, weakened many important  socialization institutions (i.e., 
churches, political machines, community organizations), reduced job- 
finding networks in inner cities, and reduced the number of work role 
models for children. Wilson (1987) identifies three key environmental 
conditions--high rates of male unemployment in local labor markets,  
highly concentrated poverty, and low proportions of middle-class 
neighborsmbut  he emphasizes the lack of available jobs as the most 
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important of these. According to Wilson, this lack of jobs accounts 
both for the high rates of parental and neighborhood welfare use in 
the inner cities and for the joblessness among young men raised in 
the inner cities. Wilson's model implies that time limits on AFDC 
need to be accompanied by programs that will improve job oppor- 
tunities for ghetto residents. 
Mead (1986, 1992) proposes a third explanation, the welfare culture 
argument. According to the welfare culture argument, when parents 
and neighbors use welfare heavily, the stigma associated with being 
on welfare drops or disappears; parents and neighbors develop self- 
defeating work attitudes and poor work ethics; and these attitudes 
are passed on to the children. In addition, adults on welfare provide 
children poor role models for work. Implicit in the welfare culture 
argument is the assumption that welfare receipt changes recipients 
and their children in ways that inhibit their adult employment. Time 
limits on welfare would be a good solution because welfare itself in 
the culprit. 
Anderson (1978) and Murray (1984) also see welfare as the prob- 
lem, but they contend that it is one of economic incentives, not of 
culture. They argue that the availability and generosity of welfare 
encourages women to go on welfare and men to transfer economic 
responsibilities for their children from themselves to the welfare sys- 
tem and to become shiftless. Because boys are likely to remain in the 
same states in which they were raised, and state welfare benefit 
levels are correlated across time, sons are likely to face the same wel- 
fare incentives as adults that their parents faced when the sons were 
growing up. That is, welfare offers both parents and sons the option 
to shift family responsibilities to the welfare system. 
Advocates of the above four models use the terms "welfare use" and 
"welfare dependence" almost interchangeably but appear to be talk- 
ing about long-term welfare use. Furthermore, time limits on welfare 
are meant to end long-term dependence--short-term users will be un- 
affected. All this suggests that analyses of intergenerational welfare 
effects should test for nonlinear effects, that is, whether effects are 
small when parents use welfare briefly but large when parents rely 
heavily on welfare. 
The above four models are best thought of as overlapping rather 
than as competing. For instance, both Mead (1986, 1992) and Wilson 
(1987, 1993) predict that children will model neighbors' work behav- 
iors. And Wilson's arguments about social isolation could be consid- 
ered a special case of the correlated disadvantages model. 
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There is a fifth possibility. Welfare provides income to single 
mothers and enables them to spend more hours on child care. If this 
time spent with children increases children's human capital, then 
parental welfare might positively affect children's work outcomes. 
Only a few analysts have investigated effects of parental welfare on 
sons' labor supply, and results are not consistent across studies (see 
Table 1 for a list of past studies). Two studies, those of Haveman and 
Wolfe (1994) and Hill and Ponza (1983), reported no consistent, nega- 
tive significant effects of parental welfare on sons' labor supply, 
whereas Corcoran, Gordon, Laren, and Solon (1992) reported a nega- 
tive and significant association between parental welfare and sons' 
labor supply. Hill and O'Neill (1993) found negative, significant ef- 
fects of parental welfare for white sons' labor supply but no effects for 
black sons; Lerman (1986) found parental welfare had a negative, sig- 
nificant effect on black sons' labor supply but that this effect disap- 
peared when a predicted parental welfare measure was used. 
Reconciling these inconsistent results is virtually impossible. As 
Table 1 shows, these studies differed a great deal: on the outcomes 
examined, on the numbers and kinds of family background measures 
examined, on measures of childhood neighborhood, labor market con- 
ditions, and state welfare benefits, on the ages and number of years 
over which background measures were computed, and on whether an- 
alyses were run separately by race. Given so many differences, it is 
difficult to isolate exactly which variations caused the inconsistencies. 
One problem with all these past studies is that no study simul- 
taneously examined effects of family, neighborhood, labor market, 
and state welfare benefits on sons' labor supply. The estimated coeffi- 
cients of parental welfare use could be picking up effects of generous 
state welfare guarantees (the incentive model), effects of omitted fam- 
ily characteristics such as family size or disability that are correlated 
with high welfare use (the correlated disadvantages model), effects of 
restricted job opportunities or of living in socially isolated neighbor- 
hoods (Wilson's [1987] structural-environmental model) or t rue  nega- 
tive effects of the welfare culture. This article improves on past re- 
search by simultaneously including extensive parental background 
measures, underclass neighborhood measures, labor market vari- 
ables, and state benefit measures. 
A second limitation of past research is that  only Haveman and 
Wolfe (1994) and Hill and Ponza (1983) tested for nonlinear welfare 
effects. Most theories and the proposed welfare reforms apply to 
heavy welfare use. Further, only Corcoran et al. (1992) and Hill and 
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O'Neill (1993) examined effects of growing up in neighborhoods with 
high rates of welfare use. Both the cultural and structural-environ- 
mental  models posit tha t  neighbors are important  socializing influ- 
ences. 
Third, because of small sample sizes, Corcoran et al. (1992) and 
Haveman  and Wolfe (1994) did not est imate models separately for 
black sons and white sons. It  is plausible tha t  effects of parental  and 
neighborhood welfare use on sons' labor supply may  differ by race. A 
number  of analysts  have reported that  effects of parental  welfare use 
on children's schooling differed by race (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, 
Klebanov, & Sealand, 1993; Duncan & Yeung, 1994; Haveman,  Wolfe, 
& Spaulding, 1991; Hill & O'Neill, 1993). And Hill and O'Neill (1993) 
found strong race differences in effects of parental  welfare use on 
sons' labor supply. 
Fourth,  the studies listed in Table 1 varied in the lengths of the 
periods over which background measures  (including the welfare mea- 
sures) were computed from one year  only (Hill & O'Neill, 1993; Ler- 
man, 1986) to as many  as ten years  (Haveman & Wolfe, 1994). Re- 
search by Solon (1992) suggests tha t  background income measures  
should be calculated for at  least three years. 1 Solon (1992) regressed 
sons' earnings on fathers '  earnings, varying the time period over 
which paternal  earnings were calculated. The correlation between fa- 
thers '  and sons' earnings appeared to stabilize when fathers'  earnings 
were computed over a three-year period. 
Sample ,  Data,  a n d  Variables  
Research Strategy 
This article analyzes how family welfare use, neighborhood welfare use, 
and state welfare benefits affect sons' adult work hours, using a sample of 
young men from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID has 
followed the economic fortunes of about 5,000 American families since 1968. 
Poor families were oversampled, and the sample is weighted to adjust for this 
oversampling and sample nonresponse since 1968. One advantage of the 
PSID is that it followed children from sample families as they left home and 
started up their own families. Thus the PSID provided contemporaneous re- 
ports of background variables by parents during childhood years and chil- 
dren's own contemporaneous reports of their adult labor supply. 
The sample included 787 nonblack men and 571 black men aged 25 to 35 
years in 1988. In 1968 these respondents were aged 5 to 15 years and were 
children in PSID families. To be included in the intergenerational analysis, a 
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r e s p o n d e n t  h a d  to  be  o b s e r v e d  a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  y e a r s  as  a ch i ld  b e t w e e n  ages  5 
a n d  17 y e a r s  a n d  to  h a v e  f o r m e d  h i s  o r  h e r  o w n  a d u l t  h o u s e h o l d  (as  a h e a d  or  
wife)  b y  or  be fo re  1988. 
T h e  o u t c o m e  m e a s u r e  w a s  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  w o r k  h o u r s  s ince  age  25 y e a r s  
(Table 2 l i s t s  v a r i a b l e s  u s e d  in  t h e s e  ana lyses ) .  W o r k  h o u r s  w e r e  r e l a t e d  to 
TABLE 2 
Variab les ,  Means ,  a n d  S t a n d a r d  D e v i a t i o n s  a 
Variables 
Black men Nonblack men  
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Dependent Variable 
Average annual  work hours 
Background Welfare Measures 
Family welfare 
Average annual  welfare incomes 
(WELF) (1000's of 1988 $s) 
% families with welfare incomes 
(WELF) in following ranges: 
WELF = 0 39.7 
WELF = $1-5000 32.6 
WELF = $5,000-$7500 12.3 
WELF = $7500 or more 15.4 
WELF = 0 
WELF = $1-1500 
WELF = $1,500-$5000 
WELF = $5000 or more 
Neighborhood welfare 
% families who receive public assis- 
tance (% PA): 
% PA = 0-10 50.5 
% PA = 10-15 19.1 
% PA = 15-25 24.0 
% PA = 25 or more 6.0 
% PA = 0-5 
% PA = 5-15 
% PA = 15 or more 
Other Welfare Measures 
Family income/needs (Y/N) 
(Y/N) = 0-1.25 53.1 
(Y/N) = 1.25-2.00 19.1 
(Y/N) = 2-3 24.4 
(Y/N) = 3 or more 6.0 
Family variables 
Ever lived with female head 40.0 
Percent  years lived with female head 31.5 
Head's education 8.5 
Percent  years head was disabled 20.8 
1780 709 2092 574 
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TABLE 2 Continued 
Variables 
Black men Nonblack men 
Standard Standard 
Mean deviation Mean deviation 
Number of children 4.4 2.2 10.3 1.6 
Head's mean annual work hours 1526 984 2149 705 
Childhood neighborhood measures 
% poor 27.2 13.1 11.0 9.0 
% families with incomes > 15K/30K 10.6 6.6 23.8 15.3 
% men unemployed 6.3 4.7 3.8 2.4 
Labor Market Measures 
Male unemployment rate in childhood 
labor market 3.8 1.6 4.3 1.8 
Male unemployment rate in adulthood 
labor market 6.4 2.2 6.7 2.6 
State Benefit Measures 
During childhood years 
AFDC-FS guarantee ($100's/month) 761 174 854 152 
Average (per capita) Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 180 117 220 141 
% years AFDC-U available 38.5 46.4 66.6 42.4 
During adult years 
AFDC-FS guarantee ($100's/month) 599 121 645 121 
Average (per capita) Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 239 66 260 65 
% years AFDC-U available 50.8 47.1 64.4 44.2 
N 571 787 
Note: Standard deviations are only provided for continuous variables. 
measures  of pa ren ta l  welfare and neighborhood welfare dur ing  childhood. The 
measure  of family welfare was the  sum of income from AFDC, other  welfare,  
and  SSI, plus the  value  of Food Stamps.  Pa ren ta l  welfare was measured  by the  
amount  of benefits  r a the r  than  by the number  of years  welfare was received 
because the  welfare cul ture a rgument  assumes  tha t  extensive dependence on 
welfare changes individuals '  values and motivation. In  fact, anyone whose aver- 
age year ly  income from welfare was high during childhood likely spent  consider- 
able t ime on welfare. The measure  of neighborhood welfare was the proportion of 
families in the neighborhood receiving public assistance. 2 These childhood welfare 
measures  were averaged over all the years  a child was observed in the PSID 
between ages 4 and 16 years. For  some sons, parental  welfare income was mea- 
sured for only three  years,  over the sons' ages 14 to 16 years; for others, parenta l  
welfare income was measured for as much as  thir teen years, over ages 4 to 16 
years. This means  tha t  for many  sons, parenta l  welfare was measured mostly 
du~ng  the sons' preteen and teen years. Thus these analyses apply mostly to 
effects of parenta l  welfare receipt during those years2 
The p a r e n t a l  and  neighborhood welfare d u m m y  specifications examined  in 
ana lyses  differed because  blacks were much more l ikely  t h a n  nonblacks  to 
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TABLE 3 
Effec t s  o f  F a m i l y  a n d  N e i g h b o r h o o d  Welfare  o n  B l a c k  Men's  Work H o u r s  
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 1 2A 3A 4A 
Family welfare 
Average annua l  welfare incomes 
(WELF) (1000's of 1988 $s) 
WELF = $1-5,000 
WELF = $5,000-$7,500 
WELF = $7,500 or more 
- 32* 
(7) 
- 8 9  - 9 0  - 1 9  
(69) (68) (75) 
- 140 - 1 3 8  - 2 6  
(103) (102) (112) 
- 4 9 1 " *  -483**  -353**  
(98) (92) (107) 
Neighborhood welfare 
% families who receive public assis tance -7 .35*  
(% PA) (3.40) 
% PA = 0 - 1 0  
% PA = 10-15 - 139 
(81) 
% PA = 15-25 - 9 4  
(79) 
% PA = 25 or more - 163 
(99) 
% PA 10% or more - 1254 - 131" 
(63) (63) 
Family income/needs (Y/N) 
(Y/N) = 0-1.25 -263**  
(110) 
(Y/N) = 1.25-2.00 - 172" 
(108) 
(Y/N) = 2-3 
(Y/N) = 3 or more 1 
(171) 
N 571 571 571 571 
R 2 .148 .157 .156 .166 
Note: Dashes (- 's) represen t  the omit ted category in a series of dummy variables. Stan-  
dard  errors are in  parentheses .  
~p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
l ive  i n  f a m i l i e s  a n d  c o m m u n i t i e s  w i t h  h i g h  r a t e s  of  w e l f a r e  u s e  (see  T a b l e  2). 
F o r  b l a c k  sons ,  t h e  p a r e n t a l  w e l f a r e  u s e  d u m m i e s  w e r e  $ 1 - 5 , 0 0 0  p e r  year ,  
$ 5 , 0 0 0 - 7 , 5 0 0  p e r  year ,  a n d  $7 ,500  or  m o r e  p e r  year ,  a n d  t h e  n e i g h b o r h o o d  
w e l f a r e  u s e  d u m m i e s  w e r e  0 - 1 0 %  of f a m i l i e s  o n  we l f a r e ,  1 0 - 1 5 %  of  f a m i l i e s  
on  we l f a r e ,  1 5 - 2 5 %  of  f a m i l i e s  o n  we l f a r e ,  a n d  25% or m o r e  f a m i l i e s  on  wel-  
f a r e  (Tab le  3). F o r  n o n b l a c k  sons ,  t h e  p a r e n t a l  w e l f a r e  u s e  d u m m i e s  w e r e  $ 1 -  
1 ,500 p e r  yea r ,  $ 1 , 5 0 0 - 5 , 0 0 0  p e r  year ,  a n d  $5 ,000  or  m o r e  p e r  yea r ,  a n d  t h e  
n e i g h b o r h o o d  w e l f a r e  u s e  d u m m i e s  w e r e  0 - 5 %  of  f a m i l i e s  o n  we l f a re ,  5 - 1 5 %  
of  f a m i l i e s  o n  w e l f a r e ,  a n d  15% or  m o r e  f a m i l i e s  o n  w e l f a r e  (Tab le  4). 
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T A B L E  4 
E f f e c t s  o f  F a m i l y  a n d  N e i g h b o r h o o d  W e l f a r e  o n  N o n b l a c k  M e n ' s  W o r k  H o u r s  
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 1 2B 3B 4B 
Family welfare 
Average annua l  welfare incomes 
(WELF) (1000's of 1988 $s) 
WELF = $1-1,500 
WELF = $1,500-$5,000 
WELF = $5,000 or more 
- 11.2 
(9.7) 






WELF = $0-1,500 - - 
WELF = $1,500 or more - 174t - 8 7  
(87) (100) 
Neighborhood welfare 
% families who receive public assistance 1.6 3.5 
(% PA) (4.7) (4.8) 
% PA = 0 - 5  
% P A  = 5 -15  - 7 4  
(47) 
% PA = 15 or more 147 
(93) 
Family income/needs (Y/N) 
(Y/N) = 0-1 .25 
(Y/N) = 1.25-2.00 
(Y/N) = 2 - 3  
(Y/N) = 3 or more 
N 787 787 787 











Note: Dashes (- 's) represen t  the  omitted category in a series of dummy variables. Stan-  
dard  errors are in parentheses .  
~p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01 
T h e  a n a l y s e s  e x a m i n e d  a w ide  r a n g e  of  f a m i l y  a n d  n e i g h b o r h o o d  v a r i a b l e s .  
T h e  f a m i l y  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  f a m i l y  i n c o m e / n e e d s ,  w h e t h e r  t h e  son  e v e r  
l i ved  i n  a f e m a l e - h e a d e d  f ami ly ,  p e r c e n t  y e a r s  o b s e r v e d  i n  a f e m a l e - h e a d e d  
f ami ly ,  4 h e a d ' s  e d u c a t i o n ,  w h e t h e r  h e a d  w a s  d i s a b l e d ,  n u m b e r  of  c h i l d r e n ,  
a n d  h e a d ' s  w o r k  h o u r s .  T h e  n e i g h b o r h o o d  v a r i a b l e s  i n c l u d e d  p o v e r t y  r a t e ,  
p e r c e n t  of  f a m i l i e s  e a r n i n g  m o r e  t h a n  $15 ,000  i n  1970 (over  $30 ,000  in  1980),  
a n d  p e r c e n t  of  m a l e s  u n e m p l o y e d .  T h e  f a m i l y  a n d  n e i g h b o r h o o d  m e a s u r e s ,  
l ike  t h e  w e l f a r e  v a r i a b l e s ,  w e r e  a v e r a g e d  ove r  a l l  t h e  y e a r s  a ch i ld  w a s  ob- 
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served at home up to age 16. Thus there were at least three and as many as 
thirteen years of data for each respondent on the background and welfare 
variables. Because Wilson (1987) stresses the importance of labor market con- 
ditions, measures of the male unemployment rate for respondents' relevant 
childhood and adult labor market areas were also included in analyses2 
To test the incentive model, three measures of state welfare benefits were 
merged with the PSID records: the value of the state standard AFDC and 
Food Stamp payment for a family of four with zero income, per capita Medi- 
caid expenditures on AFDC families, and whether there was an AFDC-U pro- 
gram in effect. The measures of state welfare benefits were adjusted for infla- 
tion and were averaged over all the years a child was observed at home. State 
welfare measures were also created for each year the respondent was ob- 
served after age 24 years. 
M o d e l  
Background effects on work hours were caluculated by estimating the coef- 
ficient vector ~ in the regression equation 
Yit = fl'Xi + O'Oit + ~'Wit + ~P'Ait + }"Lit + eit (1) 
where Yit = hours worked by individual i in year t 
xi = measures of family and neighborhood background including state 
welfare benefits and labor market conditions during childhood 
D i t  = measures of labor market demand facing individual i in year t 
Wit = measures of state welfare benefits in individual i's state at time t 
Ait and Lit a r e  dummies capturing age and year effects 
Because the PSID is longitudinal, each respondent's work hours (Yit) can be 
observed for multiple years, t. Analysis was restricted to observations from 
the interviews (up through 1988) at which the respondent was at least 25 
years old. For example, for an individual aged 15 in 1968 (the upper age 
limit), Yit cotlld be observed for as many as eleven years (from ages 25 to 35 
and over the interview years 1978 to 1988). At the other extreme, an individ- 
ual aged 5 years in 1968 (the lower age limit) would turn 25 in 1988 and thus 
only the 1988 observation of Y~t could be used in this analysis. Age and year 
dummies (Air and Lit) were included to control for life cycle and business cycle 
effects. 
I f  equation (1) were averaged over all Ti usable years for each individual, 
then: 
Yi = ~'xi + O'Di + ~b'Wi + ~P'Ai + ?'Li + ei (2) 
where for any outcome variable, average adulthood annual work hours, Yi "= 
Yit / Ti. The average error term e i is likely to be somewhat heteroskedastic 
t 
because it was averaged over different numbers of years for different individuals2 
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A n a l y s i s  
The analysis proceeded as follows. First, sons' annual adulthood 
work hours were regressed on the measures of parental and childhood 
neighborhood welfare to estimate the simple associations between 
parental and neighborhood welfare use and men's labor supply. Next, 
nonlinear welfare specifications were examined to test if heavy wel- 
fare dependency had disproportionately large effects on men's labor 
supply. Then measures of family background, childhood neighbor- 
hood, childhood and adult labor markets, and childhood state and 
adult state welfare benefits were successively added to the regression 
to see how much of the observed associations between parental and 
neighborhood welfare were attributable to these factors. The final 
analysis section discusses and compares effects of each set of factors 
on men's work hours. 
Associations between Parental and Neighborhood Welfare and Sons" 
Labor Supply 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results when sons' annual adulthood work 
hours were regressed on measures of parental and neighborhood wel- 
fare. Results using continuous welfare measures are recorded in col- 
umn 1; results using dummy variables are recorded in column 2; and 
the final specifications of the welfare measures are reported in col- 
umn 3. 
Recall that the parental and neighborhood dummy specifications 
differed for blacks and nonblacks because of differences in distribu- 
tions and that  blacks were much more likely to live in families and 
communities with high rates of welfare use. 
Family welfare had a significant, negative, nonlinear association 
with black sons' adult labor supply. Controlling for neighborhood wel- 
fare levels (Model 3A), black sons raised in homes where parental 
income from welfare averaged $7,500 or more per year worked 483 
hours (or about 12 weeks) less per year than did black sons raised in 
homes where parents never received welfare. Childhood neighborhood 
welfare use also was negatively associated with black sons' labor sup- 
ply. Controlling for family welfare levels (Model 3A), black men raised 
in communities where 10% or more of their neighbors received public 
assistance worked 125 hours less per year (or about 3 weeks less per 
year) than did black men raised in communities with lower rates of 
welfare receipt. 
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Results were much less striking for nonblack sons. Controlling for 
neighborhood welfare levels (Model 3B), nonblack men raised in fami- 
lies where parental welfare averaged $1,500 or more per year worked 
174 hours less per year (about 4 1/2 weeks less per year) than did 
nonblack men raised in families with little or no welfare receipt, and 
this effect was only marginally significant. Controlling for family wel- 
fare levels (Model 3B), the welfare receipt of their childhood neigh- 
bors had no association with nonblack men's work hours. 
Poverty and Family Background 
The observed associations between parental welfare and sons' labor 
supply may not be true effects but might be picking effects of omitted 
background disadvantages that are correlated with parental welfare 
receipt. One obvious candidate here is parental poverty. Parents on 
welfare were usually poor, and perhaps being raised in poverty re- 
duced sons' ability to find steady work as adults. To test for this, mea- 
sures of the ratio of parental income to parental needs (where needs 
is the census poverty line) were added to the regressions. Four dum- 
mies representing four levels of income/needs (Y/N) were included: 
Y/N = 0-1.25 (poor); Y/N = 1.25-2 (low income); Y/N = 2-3 (aver- 
age income); Y/N = 3 or more. Tables 3 and 4, column 4, report re- 
sults. 
Being raised in poverty reduced men's labor supply, and a large 
part of the association between parents' welfare use and sons' work 
hours was owing to these poverty effects on sons' labor supply. Being 
raised in poverty, rather than having a family income-to-needs ratio 
of 2 to 3, reduced blacks' adult work hours by 263 hours per year (i.e., 
about 6 1/2 weeks per year) and nonblacks' adult work hours by 155 
hours per year (i.e., about 4 weeks per year). When the parental in- 
come/needs dummies were added to the black sons' regression (mov- 
ing from Model 3A to Model 4A), the work hours reduction associated 
with heavy parental welfare use dropped by one-quarter--from 483 
hours (about 12 weeks) per year to 353 hours (about 9 weeks) per 
year - -and  the work hour reduction associated with parental welfare 
receipt below $7,500 per year virtually disappeared. When the in- 
come/needs dummies were added to the nonblack sons' regression 
(moving from Model 3B to Model 4B), the reduction in work hours 
associated with welfare was halved--from 174 hours per year to 87 
hours per year (note insignificant coefficient). 
Next additional measures of family backgroundmhead's work 
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hours, head's education, whether the son lived in a female-headed 
household, percent years observed in a female-headed household, 
number of children, and whether head was disabled--were added to 
the regressions. Because coefficients on all these background mea- 
sures were insignificantly different from zero with the exception of 
heads work hours, only the coefficients on head's work hours were 
reported (Tables 5 and 6, column 1). Being raised in a household 
where the head worked regularly (2,000 hours per year versus 1,000 
hours per year) increased nonblack sons' adult work hours by 142 
hours (or about 3 1/2 weeks) per year (significant) and black sons' 
work hours by 73 hours (or about 2 weeks) per year (not significant). 
This provides some confirmation for either Mead's (1986, 1992) thesis 
that sons use parents as role models for work or Wilson's (1987) argu- 
ment that employed parents help children obtain jobs. Controlling for 
family background measures other than parental income wiped out 
the association between parental welfare and sons' work hours for 
nonblack sons but reduced the association between heavy parental 
welfare use and sons' work hours only slightly for black sons. 
The above findings provide support for the correlated disadvan- 
tages explanation of welfare effects on men's labor supply. For non- 
blacks, the estimated association between parents' welfare use and 
sons' adult work hours disappeared when parental income/needs and 
other family background measures were controlled. About half of the 
reduction was owing to controlling parental poverty and about half to 
controlling parental work hours. For blacks, there was no association 
between parental welfare receipt of less than $7,500 per year and 
sons' adult work hours once parental poverty was controlled, and the 
effect of heavy parental welfare use on black sons' labor supply 
dropped by one-fourth once parental poverty was controlled. 
Neighborhood and Labor Market 
This analysis explored the structural explanations of the associa- 
tions between childhood welfare and men's work hours by adding 
neighborhood and labor market  variables to the work hours regres- 
sions (see Tables 5 and 6, columns 2 and 3). Three community mea- 
sures were added. These variables were chosen to represent the three 
key neighborhood conditions emphasized in Wilson's (1987) struc- 
tural-environmental model: poverty concentration (percent poor), pro- 
portions of middle-class neighbors (percent families with incomes 
M a r y  C o r c o r a n  a n d  Terry A d a m s  255 
TABLE 5 
Ef fec t s  o f  B a c k g r o u n d ,  L a b o r  Market ,  a n d  S ta te  Welfare  o n  
B l a c k  Men's  Work H o u r s  
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 5A 6A 7A 8A 
Family measures  
WELF = $1-5,000 
WELF = $5,000-$7,500 
WELF = $7,500 or more 
(Y/N) = 0-1 .25  
(Y/N) = 1.25-2.00 
(Y/N) = 2 - 3  
(Y/N) = 3 or more 
Annua l  work hours  of head  (1000's) 
Other  family var iables  
Childhood neighborhood measures  
% PA > 10% 
% poor 
% families wi th  incomes > 15K/30K 
% men  unemployed 
Labor marke t  measures  
Male unemployment  ra te  in childhood 
labor marke t  
Male unemployment  ra te  in  adul t  labor 
marke t  
State  benefi t  measures  dur ing childhood 
years  
AFDC-FS guaran tee  ($100's/month) 
Average (per capita) Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 
% years  AFDC-U available 
- 3  - 12 - 3  - 1 
(79) (79) (78) (79) 
20 30 68 75 
(126) (126) (125) (126) 
- 3 1 7 "  - 2 8 0 *  - 2 1 8  - 2 0 7  
(135) (136) (135) (142) 
- 2 5 9 *  - 2 9 9 *  -333**  -334**  
(121) (125) (126) (129) 
- 170 - 1 9 8 t  - 1 9 0 t  - 2 0 1 t  
(100) (111) (111) (112) 
- 8  13 55 44 
(174) (173) (172) (173) 
73 56 28 24 
(54) (55) (55) (55) 
J J J J 
- 129" 
(64) 
- 9 8  - 2 3  - 8  
(73) (78) (80) 
4.9 2.6 2.5 
(3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 
3.4 5.9 7.2 
(6.2) (6.3) (6.4) 
- 22.8** - 4.3 - 2.2 
(8.3) (9.7) (10.0) 
- 5 5 . 8  - 4 7 . 0  
(34.7) (38.5) 




- 6 6  
(60) 
- 1 . 2  
(1.5) 
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TABLE 5 Continued 
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 5A 6A 7A 8A 
State benefit measures  during adult years 
AFDC-FS guarantee ($100's/month) 
Average (per capita)Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 
% years AFDC-U available 
N 571 571 571 
R 2 .177 .190 ,219 








Note: Dashes (-'s) represent  the omitted category in a series of dummy variables. 
Checks (,/) note tha t  the family variables (originally presented in Table 2) were in- 
cluded as control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
tP < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
>$15,000 to $30,000), and male joblessness (percent men unem- 
ployed). 7 Including the measures of male unemployment in childhood 
neighborhood permitted a test of Wilson's predictions that employed 
males serve as role models for boys and connect boys to job networks. 
Measures of the male unemployment rates in sons' childhood and 
adult labor markets were added to test Wilson's prediction that the 
lack of job opportunities in local labor markets was the key structural 
cause of young black men's low work hours. 
TABLE 6 
Effects of  Background, Labor Market, and State Welfare on 
Nonblack Men's Work Hours 
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 5B 6B 7B 8B 
Family measures 
WELF = $0-1,500 . . . .  
WELF = $1,500 or more - 3  19 31 43 
(108) (107) (109) (109) 
(Y/N) = 0-1.25 - 98 - 124 - 144 - 167 
(102) (103) (104) (105) 
(Y/N) = 1.25-2.00 3.5 2 4 - 4  
(67) (67) (67) (67) 
(Y/N) = 2-3  . . . .  
(Y/N) = 3 or more 8 - 1 1  - 1 7  - 3 3  
(56) (57) (57) (57) 
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TABLE 6 Continued 
Model Model Model Model 
Variables 5B 6B 7B 8B 
Annual work hours of head (1,000's) 142"* 134"* 135"* 
(37) (37) (38) 
Other family variables / / / 
Childhood neighborhood measures 
% receiving PA 6.4 
(5.t) 
% poor 
% families with incomes > 15K/30K 
% men unemployed 
Labor market  measures 
Male unemployment rate in childhood 
labor market  
Male unemployment rate in adult labor 
market  
State benefit measures during childhood 
years 
AFDC-FS guarantee ($100's/month) 
Average (per capita) Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 
% years AFDC-U available 
State benefit measures during adult years 
AFDC-FS guarantee ($100's/month) 
Average (per capita) Medicaid value 
($100's/month) 
% years AFDC-U available 
N 787 787 787 




14.6" 12.8r 15.5" 
(7.3) (7.5) (7.7) 
2.8 3.6 - .4 
(3.6) (3.8) (4.0) 
3.0 2.7 2.7 
(2.2) (2.3) (2.3) 
-31 .0"*  -35 .7"*  -30 .7"*  
(10.3) (12.5) (12.7) 
15.0 16.9 
(17.4) (17.9) 








- 4  
(33) 
- 4 2  
(39) 




Note: Dashes (-'s) represent the omitted category in a series of dummy variables. 
Checks ( / )  note that  the family variables (originally presented in Table 2) were in- 
cluded as control variables. Standard errors are in parentheses, 
tp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Results  for young black men were strongly consistent with Wilson's 
emphasis  on job opportunities. Black men who grow up in neighbor- 
hoods with many  unemployed men worked less as adults. An increase 
of 1% in male unemployment  in black sons' childhood neighborhoods 
was associated with a reduction of 23 work hours (or about 1/2 week) 
per year. This appears  to be due to labor market  opportunities ra ther  
than to role modeling. When labor market  unemployment  rates mea- 
sured during childhood and adulthood years were added to the black 
sons' regressions of work hours on family and neighborhood back- 
ground, the coefficients on neighborhood male unemployment  became 
very small, while the coefficients on the labor market  unemployment  
variables were large and negative2 An increase of 1% in the male 
unemployment  rate in black men's childhood labor market  was associ- 
ated with a reduction in adult  work hours of 56 hours (or about  1 1/2 
weeks) per year, and a 1% increase in the male unemployment  rate in 
one's adult  labor marke t  was associated with a reduction of 53 work 
hours per year. 
Results  fur ther  suggested that  s tructural  labor market  factors ac- 
counted for a large par t  of the associations between parental  and 
childhood neighborhood welfare and black sons' work hours. When 
neighborhood variables and labor market  variables were added to the 
black men's work hours regressions, the reduction in work hours as- 
sociated with heavy parental  welfare use ($7,500 or more per  year) 
dropped from 317 hours (about 8 weeks) per year  to 218 hours (about 
5 1/2 weeks) per year  and the reduction in work hours associated with 
childhood neighborhood welfare use disappeared entirely. Most of this 
reduction was the result  of the labor market  unemployment variables. 
The results for nonblack sons were much more consistent with ei- 
ther  Mead's (1986, 1992) or Wilson's (1987) role modeling stories and 
with Wilson's job network story. When the three neighborhood vari- 
ables were added to the nonblack sons' regression, only one showed 
sizable and significant effects. Nonblack sons raised in communities 
with high rates of male unemployment  worked less as adults. This 
coefficient was unchanged when labor market  unemployment  mea- 
sures were added. 
State Welfare Benefits 
Welfare incentive effects were investigated by adding measures  of 
the state welfare benefits facing the sons' parents  when the sons lived 
at home and facing the sons when the sons were adults (see Tables 5 
and 6, column 4). State  welfare incentives did not seem to be a major 
Mary Corcoran and Terry Adams 259 
cause of low work hours among black men. All the state welfare mea- 
sures were insignificant in the black sons' regressions, and some coef- 
ficients had the wrong sign2 For nonblack sons there was some evi- 
dence that  s ta te  welfare benefits were related to adult  work hours. 
An additional $100 per month in the childhood state's AFDC/FS (FS 
= Food Stamps) guarantees  was associated with a marginally signifi- 
cant 46 hours (or about  I week) per year  reduction in nonblack sons' 
work hours, bu t  none of the measures  of adult  state welfare benefits 
were significantly related to nonblack men's work hours. It is puz- 
zling that  among nonblacks, sons' work hours were more affected by 
the state welfare benefits facing their parents  than  by the state wel- 
fare benefits they themselves faced as adults. 1~ 
Race Differences in Work Hours Equations 
The factors tha t  influenced adult  sons' labor supply differed consid- 
erably by race. For black sons, three factors were important:  parental  
poverty (Y/N -- 0-1.25)  or parental  low income (Y/N = 1.25-2), the 
male unemployment  rates in childhood labor markets  and in adult  
labor markets ,  and extremely heavy parental  welfare receipt (WELF 
= $7,500 or more) (Table 5, column 4). 11 The effects of parental  poverty 
and labor market  unemployment were particularly large. Black sons 
raised in poor families worked 334 hours (or about 8 1/2 weeks) less per 
year  than did black sons raised in moderate to high income families. 
And a 1% increase in male unemployment in black song adult  labor 
markets was associated with a drop in work hours of 54 hours (or about 
1 1/2 weeks) per year. Parental  economic resources and structural eco- 
nomic conditions were key predictors of black sons' labor supply. 
For nonblacks, the main factors tha t  mat tered were the average 
hours worked by the head of the household in which the sons lived as 
a child and the proportion of unemployed men in the childhood neigh- 
borhood (Table 6, column 4). Being raised in poverty was associated 
with a 167-hour (or about  a 4-week) reduction in work hours per year, 
bu t  this effect, though large, was not statistically significant. The la- 
bor marke t  unemployment  variables were never significant. These re- 
sults suggest  tha t  nonblack sons may  model their  work effort on tha t  
of their  parents  and neighbors. 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
Growing up in families that  use welfare does not reduce most sons' 
ability to obtain regular, full-time employment as adults. There is no 
260 Journal  of  Family  and Economic Issues 
association between family welfare income and work hours for non- 
black sons once family income and needs and head's work hours are 
controlled. For black sons, the effects of family welfare on work 
hours depend on how much welfare their parents received. Sons 
raised in families that  received less than $7,500 per year in welfare 
work just  as many hours as do sons raised in families that  never 
received welfare once parental income and needs is controlled. But 
extremely high family welfare income ($7,500 or more per year) was 
consistently associated with a large reduction in work hours. Of the 
black sons whose parents ever reported welfare income, only one in 
four had parents who reported $7,500 or more welfare income per 
year. 
Why is very heavy family welfare use associated with lower adult 
work hours for black men? There are two obvious possibilities: paren- 
tal poverty and structural labor market conditions. Controlling for 
both these factors reduces the estimated association between heavy 
parental welfare use by more than half from 483 hours (about 12 
weeks) per year to 218 hours (about 5 1/2 weeks) per year. This effect 
is still large, though only marginally significant. 
Being raised in communities with high rates of welfare use does not 
reduce men's adult labor supply. For nonblacks, there is never a nega- 
tive effect of childhood neighbors' welfare use on sons' work hours. 
For blacks, there is a moderate negative association between child- 
hood neighbors' welfare use and sons' work hours, but this association 
disappears once controls are added for labor market male unemploy- 
ment. This weakens Mead's (1986, 1992) cultural argument. Appar- 
ently, job opportunities are more important than is a childhood neigh- 
borhood welfare culture in explaining black men's labor supply. 
Results on welfare incentive effects are mixed. The state welfare 
benefit measures are never significantly related to black men's work 
hours. The state welfare benefits facing nonblack men as adults are 
also not significantly related to these men's work hours. But the state 
AFDC/FS guarantee facing the nonblack sons' parents when the sons 
are children is significantly and negatively related to sons' work 
hours. 
Our results provide much more support for explanations that at- 
tribute black male joblessness to growing up economically disadvan- 
taged and to structural labor market problems than to the welfare 
culture or welfare incentive explanations. Parental poverty and labor 
market unemployment rates are much more powerful predictors of 
black men's work hours than is parental welfare. This is consistent 
Mary Corcoran and Terry Adams 261 
with Wilson's structural-environmental explanation of black male job- 
lessness. 
The most powerful intergenerational predictors of nonblack men's 
low work hours are parental work hours and neighborhood male un- 
employment. This suggests that nonblack men model their labor mar- 
ket behavior on parents and neighbors. 
These results provide some clues as to why results from previous 
research differed so much. These analyses showed that effects of par- 
ental welfare were nonlinear (at least for black sons), TM that effects of 
parental welfare differed by race, and that the size of the estimated 
welfare effect dropped considerably when parental poverty and labor 
market male unemployment rates were controlled. This suggests that 
to assess welfare effects accurately one needs to include nonlinear 
parental welfare measures, run analyses separately for black and 
nonblack men, and include controls for parental poverty and labor 
market unemployment. None of the studies reviewed in Table 1 met 
all three of these conditions. 
Pol i cy  Impl i ca t ions  
These findings do not support antiwelfare rhetoric that attributes 
male joblessness to being raised on welfare. Family welfare has small 
or no effects on men's work hours for the majority of men whose par- 
ents receive welfare. Even though very heavy family welfare receipt is 
associated with work hour reductions for black sons, this is likely bal- 
anced by the fact that parental welfare reduces parental poverty. 
Term limits will likely do little to reduce male joblessness in the next 
generation and may increase joblessness if the term limits increase 
parental poverty. 
These results do suggest that  reducing family poverty may in- 
crease black sons' future chances of obtaining steady employment. 
Policies for reducing family poverty include raising the earned in- 
come tax credit (EITC), raising the minimum wage, making the 
child care tax credit refundable, and programs to expand and en- 
force child support (Ellwood, 1988). These policies would also in- 
crease rewards to parents' labor market  work which would help non- 
black sons. 
These results strongly support Wilson's (1987) conclusion that the 
best way to combat male joblessness is to create tight labor markets. 
Reducing male unemployment now would doubly advantage young 
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black m a l e s - - b y  increas ing  men ' s  work  hours  now and  by increas ing  
the  work  hours  of  the i r  sons in the  future.  
N o t e s  
1. Obviously, the longer the time period, the more accurate background 
measures will be. Unfortunately, panel studies are short and the num- 
ber of cases in a single-year birth cohort are small. Several birth cohorts 
must be pooled together for analysis, so each year added to the length of 
time period over which background measures are computed reduces 
sample size and thus efficiency and the ability to run analyses sep- 
arately by race and sex. 
2. Neighborhood measures were constructed by taking addresses at  which 
the respondent resided during childhood and matching those addresses 
to a 1970 or 1980 geocode. The geocode used was the smallest geographic 
unit available for that  address. For most cases, this was the census tract 
or enumeration district; in some cases the minor civil division was used. 
3. This is an important limitation. Parents are probably more likely to re- 
ceive welfare when their children are young. If  so, parents who receive 
welfare when their sons are teenagers may depend on welfare more than 
do typical welfare users, and these analyses may be overestimating ef- 
fects of parental welfare on sons' work hours. 
4. Head is defined as the man in two-parent families and in single-parent 
families headed by a man and as the woman in single-parent households 
headed by a woman. 
5. Labor market measures were constructed by taking addresses at which 
the repsondent resided aider age 24 years and matching those addresses 
to a 1980 census labor market area (LMA). These labor market areas 
were defined as follows. If  a person lived in a census metropolitan statis- 
tical area (CMSA), then that CMSA was defined to be that person's 
LMA. If a person lived in a primary metropolitan statistical area 
(PMSA) or in a standard statistical metropolitan area (SMSA), but not 
in a CMSA, then that PSMA or SMSA was assigned as that person's 
LMA. For people living in nonmetropolitan areas, the definition of LMA 
depended on the extent to which workers who lived in a county worked 
outside the county. If  20 percent or more of workers living in a county 
commuted to work outside that county, then the state economic area 
(SEA) which included that county was defined as the LMA; otherwise 
the county was defined as the LMA. SEAs are the nonmetropolitan ana- 
logue to metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) designed by the U.S. De- 
partment of Agriculture. 
6. According to the evidence in Lillard and Willis (1978) and Solon, Cor- 
coran, Gordon, and Laren (1991), transitory variation in hours of work 
across years is smaller than the permanent cross-sectional variation and 
is substantially autocorrelated, suggesting that the magnitude of this 
resulting heteroskedasticity should be smaU. 
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7. The four inc luded neighborhood measu re s  were  col l inear  bu t  not  exces- 
sively collinear.  Each  neighborhood m e a s u r e  was  regressed  on the  o ther  
neighborhood measures ,  on the  welfare  measures ,  and  on fami ly  back-  
ground measures .  The R 2 for these  regress ions  ranged  from .38 to .69. 
~bsts  were  also r u n  to see i f  the  percent  poor measu re  had  non l inea r  
effects on sons '  work  hours.  I t  did not. 
8. The  coefficient on h e a d s  work  hours  also became small .  
9. The set  of chi ldhood s ta te  welfare  measu res  and  the  set  of adul thood 
s ta te  welfare  measu re s  were  also added  sepa ra t e ly  to see i f  col l inear i ty  
be tween  the  chi ldhood and  adul thood measu res  was obscur ing signifi- 
cant  effects. There  was  no change of resul ts .  
10. I am gra tefu l  to M a r t h a  Hil l  for poin t ing  out  t h a t  th is  resu l t  was  consis- 
t en t  wi th  an  expecta t ions  model. 
11. The coefficient for male  unemploymen t  r a t e  in childhood labor  m a r k e t s  
was  la rge  bu t  insignif icant .  
12. I t  is possible  t h a t  very  heavy  welfare use  ($7,500 or more per  year )  also 
reduced nonblack  sons'  labor  supply. Because so few nonblacks  were  
ra i sed  in  famil ies  whose welfare  income averages  $7,500 or more  per  
year,  the  s tudy  did not  t e s t  for this.  
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